

CONFIDENTIAL

PART

FOREIGN
OFFICE

DEPT.

CLAIMS

TITLE:

CLAIMS : IRA Q: Middle

East Hostilities: Property: Damage
to: Compensation for:

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE
KL	Mr Bayless	4/7.						
"	claims index	7/7.						
	Mr Bayless	17/7.						
	Mr Bayless	20/7.						
	Reg	27/7						
	Mr Bayless	1/8						
	FA	7/8.						
	Mr Bayless	✓						
	Mr Bayless	16/11						
	Typing	30/11						
E.	Mr Montgomery	1/5						
E.	Mr Montgomery	24/5						
KL	Miss Hennessy	14/6						
KL	Miss Hennessy	29/8						
KL	Mr Bayless	18/9.						
	Miss Hennessy	1/11						
	Miss Hennessy	8/11						
GC	Miss Hennessy	6/12						

100 64/98
closed entered
or ac 31/352/11 1209/9

Recd. No. 515.
First Avenue House,
Holborn.

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

FILE

FILE No.

PART

OPENED

CLOSED

1967

Nov 68

KL

G 193/1/1

CONFIDENTIAL

26/3/69

8

1.

No. P.1.

(P.1931)

x ~~may~~

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy have the honour, on instructions, to request the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be so good as to reserve, by means of a formal communication to the Iraqi Government, the rights of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of United Kingdom nationals (including in particular the right to claim compensation) in respect of the loss, damage and injury which they ~~have~~ have suffered in the recent civil disturbances in Iraq.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

STOCKHOLM.

26 June, 1967.

[x Subsequent correction: text delivered as typed. I have telephoned the correction to Mr Tamm today. DB 29/6]

British Embassy,

Stockholm.

28 June, 1967.

(P.1931/67)

...

Sir Archibald Ross, after his telephone conversation with you this morning, has asked us to let you have the enclosed draft form of words about compensation for damage to British persons and property in Iraq. If you agree, the Royal Swedish Embassy in Baghdad might address a note in those terms to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a copy of the British Embassy's Note No. P.1 of 26 June 1967 which I handed to you yesterday.

*I called on T this morning
T evidently liked
this story and the
draft was sent to B's dad
yesterday.*

(D. D. BROWN)

*OK
21/6*

Ambassador Hugo Tamm,
Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

NOTE VERBALE

SUGGESTED DRAFT

The Royal Swedish Embassy, as representing the Protecting Power for British Interests, have the honour on instructions from the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enclose a copy of a communication dated 26 June 1967 from the United Kingdom Government concerning recent civil disturbances in Iraq during which loss, damage and injury was suffered by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and by United Kingdom nationals. The Royal Swedish Embassy, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, hereby reserve the rights of Her Majesty's Government and of United Kingdom nationals in respect of such loss, damage and injury, and in particular the right to claim compensation.

UNCLASSIFIED

P.1931/67

26 June 1967



Chamie J. H. V.

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 24

3 JUL 1967

(D. D. Brown)

KLG 1931/1

Pl 27/6

BRITISH EMBASSY

STOCKHOLM

**Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.**

No. P.1.

(P.1931)

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy have the honour, on instructions, to request the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be so good as to reserve, by means of a formal communication to the Iraqi Government, the rights of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of United Kingdom nationals (including in particular the right to claim compensation) in respect of the loss, damage and injury which they may have suffered in the recent civil disturbances in Iraq.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of their highest consideration.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

STOCKHOLM.

26 June, 1967.

En Clair

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 679

5 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Basra Consulate-General compound entered by mob this morning, flag burnt and building stoned. Military protection has been given but Consul-General considers it inadequate and has requested more. All are safe.

Sir R. Beaumont

Sent 1059Z 5 June

Recd 1225Z 5 June

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

Eastern Dept.

NNNNN

Reference.....

(2).

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 34
17 JUL 1967
146G 193/11.

Foreign Office Letter 6086 Stockholm

Clearly we shall claim from the
Iraqi Govt via the Swedish for damage
done to British Council Premises in
Baghdad on June 8 & to the
Council's funeral in Basra on 5 June.

I am not sure what amounts
shall be claimed. At Basra a few
pounds - say £40 shall be enough.
In Baghdad in addition to windows,
a car was wrecked & a cine projector
broken or stolen I believe. British
Council here can probably confirm.

J. 35/11

Mr. Montgomery
Eastern Dept

Claims Dept. in
conjunction

It Rich

146G 193/11

conjunction with Accommodation
Dept. are engaged in compiling
information on which claims
will be submitted on behalf
of H.M.C. and the British
Council.

Montgomery
5
7

Sir R. Beaumont

Claims Dept (? Mr Baylis)
Mr Montgomery (Eastern Dept).

Yes. You will be informed
when we are ready to present
claims for damage to official
property. - It may be a few weeks

J. Baylis
7/7

Mr Rich Mof
Reg - Claims

10
7 PA P A 176
B/C 1/2 noted AS

20 June, 1967.

KL



*With ref. to F.O. tel. no. 1201 to
Tel Aviv of 23 June.

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

(Chancery)

RECEIVED
ARCHIVE
3 JUL 1967
KLG 193/1/1

BRITISH EMBASSY
STOCKHOLM

F.O.
London, S.W.1.

P.A.

(3)

Division for Protecting
British Interests.

Re: British Claim for compensation.

B 3 U 28.6.67.
Tel. B. 8. 5.7.67.

Baghdad, 8 July, 1967.
No. B. 29.
B 5.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
B - Department, Stockholm.

Remitted by the Swedish Embassy, Division for Protecting British Interests, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, B-Department, for information. The below quoted Note Verbale was handed over to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 July 1967.

Folke Persson

Re: Compensation Claims.

No. 13

The Royal Swedish Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, acting upon instructions received from the Royal Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to forward, in its capacity of representing the Protecting Power for British Interests, a copy of a communication (No.P.1) dated 26th June 1967 from the United Kingdom Government concerning recent civil disturbances in Iraq during which loss, damage and injury was suffered by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and by United Kingdom nationals. The Embassy, on behalf of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, hereby reserves the rights of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and of United Kingdom nationals in respect of such loss, damage and injury, and in particular the right to claim compensation.

At the moment the Embassy has in mind the damages incurred at the Centre of English Studies in Baghdad and on the premises of the former British Consulate General in Basrah. Estimates of the costs of repair and restoration will be submitted at a later stage.

The Embassy would be obliged for an acknowledgement from the Ministry on receipt of the present Note.

The Royal Swedish Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

Baghdad 7 July, 1967.

FP/CES.

2 XEROX COPIES TO EASTERN DEPT 4/COMPS

117

P1937/67



4

Division for Protecting
British Interests.

Re Damages and Losses at the
Centre of English Studies
in Baghdad.

B 14 A 1.7.67

COPY (XEROX) TO LETTER
WITH ENCLOSURES TO

- i) EASTERN DEPT,
- ii) ACCOMMODATION DEPT (DSAO),
(CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPT.
- iii) ~~RESEARCH DEPT~~

Baghdad, 19 July, 1967

No. B 39

B 2

8 Encl.

26
7

To the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

B—Department.

The Swedish Embassy, Division for Protecting British Interests, has the honour to submit the following report on the Centre of English Studies in Baghdad.

1. Damages were caused to the Centre of English Studies in Baghdad on the 6 June, 1967. A list of these damages was made up on 18 June, 1967 in connexion with an inspection by the Swedish Ambassador in Baghdad, members of the Division for Protecting British Interests and Mr. Muir, the Representative of the British Council (See enclosure No. 2. to the abovesited report).
2. A Note concerning the damages was handed over by the Royal Swedish Embassy in Baghdad to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 July, 1967 (See B 29 A 8.7.67).
3. The local police in Baghdad sent away the staff of the Centre and assumed responsibility for the protection of the buildings and all equipment on 6 June, 1967 (Letter from the British Council's Representative, Mr. Muir, to the British Embassy, Baghdad, dated 6 June, 1967, annex No. 1).
4. After the inspection on 18 June, 1967 the disappearance of certain equipment was reported to this Division by Mr. Hanna Shamoon, in charge of the Centre who made this discovery immediately after he was permitted by the Iraqi Authorities to enter the Centre. A Note with complaints concerning the losses since the inspection on 18 June, 1967 was handed over by the Swedish Ambassador to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July, 1967 (annex No. 2).
5. A detailed list of damages and missing items has been prepared by Mr. H. Shamoon and is attached to this report (annexes 3 - 8).

The repair work mentioned in annex 4 is being carried out in order to protect the buildings and equipment from further abductions.

Folke Persson.

FP/G.AW.

Bil. nr. 1t. Ambassaden i Bagdad.
B-avd. skr. nr. B. 39... den 19.7. 1967
89991
89992

Reference: CF/BAG/680/3

6th June, 1967.

Dear Julian,

I attach a copy of the report I should like to send to London as soon as possible. In the meantime I must draw your attention to the fact that the police have sent away all our staff from the Centre of English Studies in Waziriyah and have assumed responsibility for the safety of the building and all equipment. The place is wide open to anyone who cares to step in through a broken window and steal anything. Would you therefore please take any steps that are considered necessary to draw the attention of the government of Iraq to the above facts.

Yours ever,

J. G. G. Muir,
Representative, Iraq.

J. F. Walker, Esq.,
H.M. Embassy,
Baghdad.

6th June, 1967.

CF/BAG/680/3

Demonstration at Centre of
English Studies.

On the morning of Tuesday, 6th June, I was in Waziriyah where I had appointments at 8.30 a.m. and 9. a.m. with the President of Mosul University and the Dean of the College of Medicine. It was here that I was told of the broadcast accusation that U.S. and British aircraft were giving support to Israel. I had of course noticed the tense state of both staff and students and had overheard several groups of students mention the British Embassy. Realising that such propaganda could make any Baghdad crowd dangerous I decided to return to the office to inform the Embassy.

2. When I arrived at the office I was told that a crowd of students had attacked the Centre and that Mr. Somerville had already gone to the Embassy to report the fact. I got in touch with Mr. Walker, Head of Chancery, who confirmed that he had spoken to Mr. Somerville, and then passed on the information about the medical students. Mr. Nash was reported to be on his way to the main office so I waited for him. I asked him to write a short report which I attach.

3. To ascertain the extent of the damage, I went to the Centre of English Studies with Mr. Nash at 10.45 to find that there had already been a second attack and that this time attackers had entered the building. Many of the windows on the ground floor had been broken, some of the library books had been taken out and scattered in the garden, the lid had been torn off the grand piano, pictures had been smashed and some inefficient attempts had been made to set fire to the place.

4. Mr. Nash and I replaced the lid of the piano, but were not allowed to take any books in from the garden, nor were we allowed to take away the microfilm reader, which was probably the most valuable piece of portable equipment left in the building. The car was upside down with its windows smashed and the new Bell & Howell projector, in the back of the car, was badly damaged. It is difficult to estimate the amount of the damage, it is not extensive at present, yet it can hardly be less than £400 or £500, assuming the Bell & Howell projector is completely written off.

5. No attempt appears to have been made to deflect the demonstrators who were nearly all, I understand, University students and who should therefore have known better. There are two police stations within a couple of hundred yards of the Centre and a large Security Police post within 5 minutes. No move to protect Council Property was made from any of these places. The Captain in charge of the police to whom I talked, confirmed that he had orders to send away all the British Council staff, but did not appear to be either friendly or co-operative.

6. In view of the inadequacy of the police guard - they appear to have little more effect than to attract the attention of demonstrators to foreign buildings - I have not asked for police protection either for the Kindergarten or for the head office and have contented myself with removing the bronze plates from both buildings.

7. Provided we are allowed to repair the windows and clean up the place soon, nothing serious will have occurred. It is above all satisfactory to be able to report that no one has been hurt.

J. G. G. Muir,
Representative, Iraq.

REPORT OF ATTACK ON
CENTRE OF ENGLISH STUDIES, BAGHDAD.

At approximately 8.30 a.m. an estimated 50 students attacked the Centre of English Studies, Waziriya.

The attack lasted 10 minutes. Bricks and tiles were hurled at the building from the road, but the assailants did not attempt to enter the premises. The plate glass windows at the front of the building were broken (the library, veranda and hall). The Centre car was also slightly damaged (broken windscreen), as were some of its contents (Bell & Howell film projector). After the attackers had left, G.C.E. Examination candidates and invigilators were evacuated by car to continue their examinations in Council Office. A police officer arrived with a detachment of men and taking responsibility for the security of the building, ordered the staff out of the building. Before I left, I saw that some of the film projectors and typewriters were locked up in the store-room.

On returning to the Centre at 10.45 a.m. it was found that the premises had been attacked again (at approx. 10.00 a.m.). This time the attackers had entered the building. Bookcases had been thrown down, and books scattered over the library. Desultory attempts had been made to fire in the building. More glass had been broken. The lid was ripped from the grand piano in the Hall. The Centre car had been overturned and further damaged. The Iraqi soldiers on guard re-affirmed their responsibility for the safety of the building.

S. T. Nash.

Division for Protecting
British Interests.

No. 30
1 enclo

The Royal Swedish Embassy, Division for Protecting British Interests, presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Embassy's Note No. 8, dated 29 June, 1967, regarding the former Centre of English Studies, Wasiriyah, Baghdad, which was severely damaged by intruders on the 6 June, 1967, has the honour to state the following.

As is known to the Ministry, the Embassy did in the past repeatedly ask for permission to inspect the premises of the Centre in order to clean up and remove the debris and the overturned Ford Zephyr motor car and to bring about the necessary repair work so that the buildings could be properly locked and placed under seal as long as the activities of the Centre are at a standstill. The site of the premises has ever since the events of 6 June, 1967 been under constant Police Guard.

In the course of the last few days, representatives of the Embassy, with the labour needed, have been at work at the Centre in order to remove the traces of the attack and to secure an estimate of the costs of repair. This latter work has already begun.

The complete inventory of the Centre was handed over to the Embassy on 17 June, 1967, and on the occasion of the Embassy's taking over the responsibility of the premises the following day, the inspection group of the Embassy could verify that no discrepancy existed between the detailed, fully up-to-date inventory, on the one hand, and the furniture and all other equipment on the premises, on the other hand.

It is therefore with the utmost regret that the representatives of the Embassy on their inspection tour last week have noted that part of the Centre's equipment is now missing. A list of all the items now missing is attached to this Note.

Under the circumstances the Embassy finds itself obliged to ask that an immediate investigation be carried out in order to ascertain who is responsible for the abduction of the missing inventory items, and, if possible, to recover and return these items, which are for the most part the property of the Government of the United Kingdom. The Embassy would appreciate to be informed, as soon as possible, of the results of this investigation

/and

- 2 -

and to get an assurance that such incidents not be repeated.

The Royal Swedish Embassy, Division for Protecting British Interests, avails itself of this opportunity to express to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Baghdad, 19 July, 1967.

To: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Baghdad.

FP/ces

BL nr 3-8 t. Ambassaden i Bagdad.
Bard. skr. nr. B 39 den 19.9. 1967

**TOTALS OF LISTS ATTACHED (EXCLUDING ITEMS NOT ESTIMATED
FOR AS SHOWN ON THE LISTS)**

1. Damages	ID. 132.000
2. Missing items	429.000
3. Kitehen etc.	52.540
4. Others	79.000
	<hr/>
Grand Total	ID. 692.540
	<hr/>

Note: Preliminary Estimates for the Repair of the Car are
ID.200.000. Proper inspection and final estimates will be
submitted in the course of a few days.

HANNA PETER SHAMOON.

15.7.67

ROYAL
SWEDISH EMBASSY
Division for Protecting
British Interests.

LIST OF MISSING ITEMS

		<u>Value</u>	
2)	<u>Kerosene Heaters</u>		
	4 Aladdin	at ID. 11.000	ID. 44.000
	1 Locally produced	at ID. 9.000	9.000
3)	<u>Mirrors</u>		
	2 mirrors from toilet rooms	at ID. 1.000	2.000
4)	<u>Persian Carpets:</u>		
	4 Persian carpets of various sizes	at ID. 40.000	160.000
5)	<u>Garden Rubber Pipe</u>		
	1 length (240 ft.) Black Garden Rubber Pipe		12.000
6)	<u>Blinds</u>		
	Blinds made of canvas for cinema		38.000
7)	<u>Display Cabinets</u>		
	2 Display cabinets with glass-fronted doors and light fittings	at ID. 7.000	14.000
8)	<u>Curtains and Runners</u>		
	1) Library 7 at ID.3.000	ID. 21.000	
	2) R/Room 5 at ID.3.000	15.000	
	3) Hall 18 at ID.3.500	63.000	
	4) Staircases 3 at ID.2.500	7.500	
	5) Classroom 7 5 at ID.4.000	20.000	
	6) Runners	126.500	
		23.500	150.000
	Total	ID. 429.000	

LIST OF THINGS REMOVED FROM THE KITCHEN AFTER THE ATTACK ON TUESDAY 6/6/1967 and the STORE AT THE BACK OF THE CENTRE

Refreshments: from the Store. The room was locked, but an entrance was forced by breaking the glass.
35 cases at fls 264 ID. 9.240

Cooking Utensils
Pots, pans, forks, knives, plates, jugs etc. 20.000

Tinned Stuff & Cigarettes

4 large tins Nescafe	3.600	
2 doz. milk	2.900	
4 tins Cocca	1.000	7.500
1 1/2 cartons 'Baghdad' cigarettes	1.750	
2 " 'Turkish' "	3.800	
1 carton 'Jumhuriya' "	.950	
2 cartons 'Craven 'A' "	3.500	
2 " 'Rothman' "	3.800	
cleenex, flour, salt, condiments etc.	2.000	15.800
		23.300
	Total ID. . . .	52.540

ESTIMATES FOR REPAIRS OF DAMAGES IN THE CENTRE OF ENGLISH STUDIES

DMMAGES

a)	<u>Window Glasses:</u>	Cleaning and fitting new window glasses:	ID.90.000
b)	<u>Book Cases</u>	: Fitting new sliding glasses with steel frames for bookcases	12.000
c)	<u>Wirenetting</u>	: New wire-netting for windows	14.000
d)	<u>Electric fittings</u>	: New electric fittings for the damaged ones	10.000
e)	<u>Chairs, tables</u>	: Repairing easy chairs and steel tables with formica tables (3 chairs and 3 tables) and notice boards	6.000
TOTAL			<u>ID.132.000</u>

LIST OF MISSING ITEMS

2) Kerosene Heaters

4 Aladdin	at ID.11.000	ID.44.000
1 Locally produced	at ID. 9.000	9.000

3) Mirrors

2 mirrors from toilet rooms	at ID.1.000	2.000
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4) Persian Carpets:

4 Persian carpets of various sizes	at ID.40.000	160.000
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5) Garden Rubber Pipe

1 length (240 ft.) Black Garden Rubber Pipe		12.000
---	--	--------

6) Blinds

Blinds made of canvas for cinema		38.000
----------------------------------	--	--------

7) Display Cabinets

2 Display cabinets with glass-fronted doors and light fittings.	at ID.7.000	14.000
---	-------------	--------

8) Curtains and Runners

1) Library 7	at ID.3.000	ID.21.000	
2) R/Room 5	at ID.3.000	15.000	
3) Hall 18	at ID.3.500	63.000	
4) Staircases 3	at ID.2.500	7.500	
5) Classroom 7	5 at ID.4.000	<u>20.000</u>	126.500
6) Runners		23.500	150.000

TOTAL

ID.429.000

LIST OF THINGS CARRIED AWAY FROM THE KITCHEN AFTER THE ATTACK ON
TUESDAY 6/6/1967 AND THE STORE AT THE BACK OF THE CENTRE.

Refreshments: from the Store. The room was locked, but an entrance was forced by breaking the glass. This was noted by H.E. The Ambassador and Mr. Muir.

35 cases at file 264

ID.9.240

Cooking Utensils

Pots, pans, forks, knives
plates, jugs, etc.

20.000

Tinned Stuff and Cigarettes

4 large tins Nescafe	3.600	
2 doz. milk	2.900	
4 tins cocoa	<u>1.000</u>	7.500
1½ cartons "Baghdad" cigarettes	1.750	
2 " "Turkish" "	8.800	
1 carton "Jumhuriya" "	.950	
2 " "Craven 'A'" "	3.500	
2 " "RothmanA" "	3.800	
Kleenex, flour, salt, conditments etc.	<u>2.000</u>	<u>15.800</u> 23.300

TOTAL

ID.52.540.

LIST OF OTHER ITEMS DAMAGED: ESTIMATES TO BE OBTAINED

Books: Damages unknown unless a complete check is made of the Library Books.

Telephone: This is a government property: cost of damage unknown.

Grand Piano: An expert is to be called to see about this. The best person to ask is Mr. Manuel Matossian (an ex-British Council Official) who is an expert on such matters. He is at the same time the leading piano tuner and repairer of pianos.

Picture Frames:

In the hall: 2	ID.3.000
In Tea Centre:Shakespeare	ID.3.000

Wooden Door of the Main Entrance at the Hall ID.10.000

3 full length Grey Curtains. Such material is not available.	ID.18.000
---	-----------

Film Projector This is rather difficult to estimate. Again Mr. Manuel Matossian, The British Council Film Officer should be consulted.

Garden: The damage done can roughly be estimated at ID.20.000 for re-planting, etc.

Cinema Screen with Scaffolding: The Screen is in good order. The steel scaffolding will have to be replaced as it is damaged.
ID.25.000.

Total of this list (other than items not estimated for):

3.000
3.000
10.000
18.000
20.000
25.000
<hr/>
ID.79.000
<hr/>

REPORT FROM MR. MANUEL MATOSSIAN: EX BRITISH COUNCIL FILM OFFICER
ABOUT THE DAMAGES DONE TO THE PIANO AND THE FILM PROJECTOR ON TUESDAY,
6/6/1967.

1. GRAND PIANO:

- a) Pedals - broken - require replacement
- b) Music Stand - " "
- c) Dumpers - " "
- d) Polishing and readjusting together with a new loose cover which seems to have been stolen or damaged.

TOTAL COST: ID.50.000

2. FILM PROJECTOR: BELL & HOWELL

- a. New Cabinet - to be imported from the U.K.
- b. Input Transformer " " " "
- c. Fil Take-up Arm " " " "
- d. Amplifier " " " "
- e. 2½" Lense - lost " " " "

Total cost about ID.150.000

If the above parts are to be imported through the Embassy then no Customs Charges will be required; if they are to be imported otherwise (this is not possible at the present moment due to financial stringencies), then an additional amount of ID.75.000 in the way of Customs Duties will have to be added, making total ID.225.000.

MANUEL MATOSSIAN.
18.7.1967.

KLG 193/1/1.



FOREIGN OFFICE

Eastern Department

LONDON, S.W.1.

18th July 1967

~~for the people~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

KL 193/1/1

16 NOV 1967

KL 193/1/1

Mr. Berman

Mr. Montgomery
(Eastern Dept.) First

IRAQ

Damages and losses as result of Middle
East events in June, 1967.

Information has been gathered about riot losses and damage to property left behind in Iraq as a result of the recent troubled situation there. The details are incomplete at present but they appear to be sufficient for present purposes and I should be grateful if you would give an opinion as to whether or not there are good grounds for presenting a governmental claim against the Iraq Government if Her Majesty's Government decided to do so.

- - - 2. A copy of Sir Richard Beaumont's despatch of 31 July about events leading up to the break of diplomatic relations with Iraq is attached. A couple of anti-British and anti-United States public demonstrations had been organised by the Iraq Government to take place in the week preceding the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June. With effect from 5 June Baghdad radio had been constantly linked to Cairo radio and on 6 June the Jordan/United Arab Republic accusation that British and American planes were giving air-cover to the Israeli forces gained widespread credence. It seems clear, however, that these broadcasts had little if any effect anywhere in the Middle East so far as the riots are concerned, most of which had taken place on 5 June, the day before the broadcasts commenced. Nevertheless, it would not be untrue to say that the Iraq authorities by their general attitude were guilty of positive hostile action in precipitating riots and the consequent damage either wilfully or through lack of foresight. The anti-British rioting caused a small amount of damage to United Kingdom property and owing to the apparent failure of the Iraq authorities to provide adequate protection against the mobs the rioters found their task easy. It appears therefore that the Iraq Government should bear responsibility for paying compensation in respect of the following.

3. Her Majesty's Government Consulate General in Basra was stoned by a mob and entered on the morning of 5 June, the day hostilities started. The flag was burnt and windows broken. The Protecting Power (Swedes) are having the damage repaired at a cost of £150.

4. The Centre of English Studies suffered damage during a demonstration by students on 6 June. A report of the same day by the

/British

CONFIDENTIAL

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Flag A
British Council Representative within (folio 4) does not show whether this took place before or after the broadcast lie. Further losses are also reported by the Swedish Embassy since the building was put under constant police guard, but as the losses amount to very little we can no doubt regard them as part of any claim which might be made in respect of general rioting, etc. The total amount is approximately £690, excluding repairs costing about £200 for damage to a Ford Zephyr car belonging to the Centre.

Folio 3.
Flag B
5. The rights of Her Majesty's Government and United Kingdom nationals were reserved on 7 July through the Swedes and the total compensation required from the Iraqis would be only about £1,040 as detailed above.

attached
6. One United Kingdom Citizen (Mr. Carnan: -/2) has supplied information about personal effects etc. left behind. He does not say why he left Iraq and on the face of it his property could not form the subject of an international claim unless the Iraq Government takes some prejudicial action in connexion with the property. We shall have to tell him so in due course.

BB Jones: 1/11/67

MR Resh 1/11

MR Jones (Claim Dept)

I have spoken to Sir R. Beaumont who agrees that this claim is justified. He suggests however that the basis of the claims should be along the following lines:-

- (a) The Iraqi authorities did not take adequate measures to discourage anti-British demonstrations and, consequently,
- (b) should have provided a correspondingly greater measure of protection for specific British institutions such as the Consulate-General in Basra and British Council in Baghdad, but failed to do so.

2. The Iraqi authorities must therefore be held responsible for the damage occasioned to British Government premises and property.

D. Montgomery
D. Montgomery
7 November, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Claims Dept.

Editor Dept.

I quite agree that the claims set out in paras. 3 & 4 of Mr. Jones' minute should go forward at the appropriate time.

However, we seem to have rather more in the way of opinion about the theoretical basis of our putative claims than we do in the way of evidence as regards of what actually happened and where the fault of Tray failed in its duty. No doubt this gap will be filled before we come to the actual presentation of claims.

2. As for Mr. Lamer, I can hardly express any final opinion until I have seen his correspondence

with Mr. Pirotti.

7. 9. 20

15 xi 62

Mr. Berman

Mr. Montgomery
(Eastern Dept.) First

IRAQ

Damages and losses as result of Middle
East events in June, 1967.

Information has been gathered about riot losses and damage to property left behind in Iraq as a result of the recent troubled situation there. The details are incomplete at present but they appear to be sufficient for present purposes and I should be grateful if you would give an opinion as to whether or not there are good grounds for presenting a governmental claim against the Iraq Government if Her Majesty's Government decided to do so.

- - - 2. A copy of Sir Richard Beaumont's despatch of 31 July about events leading up to the break of diplomatic relations with Iraq is attached. A couple of anti-British and anti-United States public demonstrations had been organised by the Iraq Government to take place in the week preceding the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June. With effect from 5 June Baghdad radio had been constantly linked to Cairo radio and on 6 June the Jordan/United Arab Republic accusation that British and American planes were giving air-cover to the Israeli forces gained widespread credence. It seems clear, however, that these broadcasts had little if any effect anywhere in the Middle East so far as the riots are concerned, most of which had taken place on 5 June, the day before the broadcasts commenced. Nevertheless, it would not be untrue to say that the Iraq authorities by their general attitude were guilty of positive hostile action in precipitating riots and the consequent damage either wilfully or through lack of foresight. The anti-British rioting caused a small amount of damage to United Kingdom property and owing to the apparent failure of the Iraq authorities to provide adequate protection against the mobs the rioters found their task easy. It appears therefore that the Iraq Government should bear responsibility for paying compensation in respect of the following.

3. Her Majesty's Government Consulate General in Basra was stoned by a mob and entered on the morning of 5 June, the day hostilities started. The flag was burnt and windows broken. The Protecting Power (Swedes) are having the damage repaired at a cost of £150.

4. The Centre of English Studies suffered damage during a demonstration by students on 6 June. A report of the same day by the

/British

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British Council Representative within (folio 4) does not show whether this took place before or after the broadcast lie. Further losses are also reported by the Swedish Embassy since the building was put under constant police guard, but as the losses amount to very little we can no doubt regard them as part of any claim which might be made in respect of general rioting, etc. The total amount is approximately £690, excluding repairs costing about £200 for damage to a Ford Zephyr car belonging to the Centre.

5. The rights of Her Majesty's Government and United Kingdom nationals were reserved on 7 July through the Swedes and the total compensation required from the Iraqis would be only about £1,040 as detailed above.

6. One United Kingdom Citizen (Mr. Carnan. -/2) has supplied information about personal effects etc. left behind. He does not say why he left Iraq and on the face of it his property could not form the subject of an international claim unless the Iraq Government takes some prejudicial action in connexion with the property. We shall have to tell him so in due course.

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EQ 3/15 done

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatch No. U/M

31 July, 1967.

SUMMARY

The Break of Diplomatic Relations with Iraq

The Iraq Government, both emotionally and because it was frightened of the U.A.R. propaganda machine, lent full support to Egypt's moves to remove the U.N.E.F., to station her own troops in Sinai, to seize Sharm al Shakh and close the Gulf of Aqaba. Popular excitement for the war was stepped up by the signing of the Jordan/U.A.R. Mutual Defence Pact. (paragraphs 1-4)

2. By the time of the outbreak of hostilities the tone of the Iraqi press had become extremely violent and was echoed by the remarks of the Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad, who gave the Iraqis to understand that the Arabs enjoyed a very large measure indeed of Soviet support. H.M. Consulate-General in Basra was attacked on the 5th of June. Araf announced that Iraq was at war with Israel and that states helping Israel would be treated as enemies. The Secretary of State's statement on the 6th of June looked as though it might lead to a détente, a hope which was thwarted by Jordan/U.A.R. accusations of British/American assistance to Israel. The Iraqis decided to break diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government. We were told to close the Embassy, the Consulate-General in Basra and the British Council. I and other members of the British community left for Tehran on the 10th of June. (paragraphs 5-12)

3. Sir D. Wright and the staff of H.M. Embassy at Tehran prepared most effective reception arrangements and the Iranian authorities were helpful in facilitating our crossing. (paragraph 14)

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4. During the crisis there was no specifically Iraqi policy, but rather a narrow nationalistic, pan-Arab policy, re-inforced by the fact that Baghdad radio was linked permanently to Cairo radio. The interests of the Iraqi people played no part. Neither was there any question of the Iraqis attributing Arab failures to Arab shortcomings. (paragraph 15)

5. The principal reason for the severance of relations was that the U.A.R. position dominated Iraqi thinking, the "lie" was at first believed and later supported out of need for a scapegoat. That the severance was complete is probably due to extremism of the Iraqi character and Iraqi military rancour against Britain. There are already indications that realistic Iraqi public servants are being smothered. The crisis has demonstrated the bankruptcy of military régimes in the Middle East. (paragraphs 16 and 17)

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Despatch No. U/N

31 July, 1967.

Sir,

The Break of Diplomatic Relations with Iraq

In the following paragraphs I have the honour to record, in so far as they concern Iraq, the events of the three weeks leading up to the breaking off of relations with Her Majesty's Government by the Iraq Government and the departure of the staff of Her Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad and Her Majesty's Consulate-General in Basra.

2. The alleged inertia of the United Arab Republic in the face of Israeli attacks on Jordan and Syria did not arouse in Iraq the criticisms and unkind jibes about sheltering behind the United Nations Emergency Force, which had been broadcast by Jordan radio and had been current in the Beirut press. This was because information media in Iraq were either under direct Government control (broadcasting and television) or indirectly controlled by the censorship exercised by the Minister of Culture and Guidance. It was also because the Iraqi President and his Government were bound to the United Arab Republic in the United Political Command and, whatever their personal feelings, were scared stiff of the United Arab Republic propaganda machine. Moreover, since August, 1966, the two successive Ministers of Guidance were markedly pro-United Arab Republic in their personal inclinations,

/as were

The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,

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as were the principal staff of the Ministry. In consequence, the publicity media in Iraq had throughout tended to build up the sincerity of the United Arab Republic's pre-occupation with the alleged dangers of an Israeli attack on Syria and they fulsomely endorsed, as the logical expression of that sincerity, the United Arab Republic's movements of troops on the 15th of May and the demand for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.) of the 17th of May. In fact, the Iraq Government, not to be outdone in their enthusiasm for the Arab cause, placed their own forces on alert on the 18th of May.

3. On the 22nd of May the Government of the United Arab Republic, whose troops had reoccupied Sharm al Shaikh, announced that the Straits of Tiran were within United Arab Republic territorial waters and that the Gulf of Aqaba would be blocked to Israeli shipping and cargoes of strategic goods for Israel in other ships. The Iraq Government immediately and publicly supported the United Arab Republic position and the Iraq Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 24th of May called in myself and the other representatives of the countries in the Security Council of the United Nations in order to endorse the United Arab Republic's position.

4. During the whole of this period the Iraqi press waxed increasingly violent and echoed President Nasser's calls (such as that made on the 25th of May to the Arab Trade Unionists) for the total annihilation of Israel. Nevertheless, the Iraqi public which since 1958 had suffered only too many interruptions in its daily life, remained as a whole unmoved, and the university and

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secondary schools where political agitation could have been expected, were providentially engaged in examinations until early in June. Thus it was that a first attempt at a public demonstration on Sunday, the 28th of May, proved a fairly tame affair particularly when its organisers realised that the Embassies of the "principal protagonists" of Israel, i.e. the United States and Britain, were closed on that day. King Hussein's visit to Cairo on the 30th of May and the signature of the Jordan-United Arab Republic Mutual Defence Pact with which the Iraq Government hastened to associate itself, undoubtedly stepped up popular excitement and the feeling that a successful war against Israel was on the point of being launched. Thus, on the night of the 31st of May information was received in the Embassy from reliable sources that pro-Nasser and left-wing Ba'ath party factions intended to "take over" a large demonstration which the Government were authorising for the following day, in order to burn and pillage both the British and American Embassies. We accordingly took our precautions. A beginning was made in burning recent papers (the regulation "weeding" was already up to date), non-essential staff was sent home and members of the British community were warned by their wardens to keep out of the centre of Baghdad. The demonstration duly took place on the 1st of June and was on a fairly large and organised scale, including Government and industrial workers transported to central Baghdad by lorry. The police, however, kept it well under control and it did not in the event approach

/either

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either the British or the American Embassies. The day was hot - in the upper 90°s. The road from Northgate to Southgate on the East bank of the Tigris was long. Moreover, it was a Thursday and the temptation to workers to knock off early and thus prolong their week-end was obviously great. The trouble-makers failed to move them. Instead, once they had reached Southgate they bathed their sore feet in the fountain, drank coca-cola, and dispersed. In consequence, a decision on the question of evacuation of families and non-essential personnel of the Embassy and of the British community which had been tentatively mooted for that day, was postponed.

5. The Iraq Government as part of their war-effort had convened a meeting of Arab oil producers for the 4th of June. When it met, it decided to withhold oil supplies from any country which was deemed to be helping Israel. Provision was made for a decision on this question to be taken collectively. However, when hostilities started this provision did not deter the Iraq Government from rushing headlong into unilateral action by ordering the Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) to stop the flow of oil from both its northern and southern fields. Indeed, this decision was so precipitous that the Director-General of Oil overlooked the fact that by making so sweeping an order, he was also cutting off supplies for Iraq as well as abroad. When the Chief Representative of the I.P.C. pointed this out to him, he was obliged to make a hasty follow-up order to permit the supply of oil to the Iraq Government's refinery at Daura.

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6. By this time, the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, however provocative the speech of the Israeli Prime Minister threatening an attack on Syria might have been, the tone of the Iraqi press which echoed that of Cairo and Damascus, and the speeches of the Iraqi President were such as to give the Israelis every reason to suppose that the Arab countries were about to attack. It is surprising that the Government of Israel, in mitigation of the accusations of aggression which have been levelled against it, has not circulated translations of these speeches and attacks. In Baghdad the tone of the Soviet Ambassador was little better than the press. As I reported in my telegram No. 596 of the 25th of May, he encouraged Arab extremism by openly fulminating against "American-backed Israeli provocation" and he certainly gave the Iraq Government to understand that the Arab cause enjoyed a very substantial measure indeed of Soviet support.

7. On the 5th of June hostilities started. On the same morning a small crowd attacked Her Majesty's Consulate-General in Basra, burned the flag and broke windows. By mid-day President Aref had announced that Iraq was at war with Israel (the Iraq Government had in fact never signed an armistice in 1949) and that any country aiding Israel would be treated as an enemy. Baghdad airport was closed to all traffic and the railway to Turkey cut. On the 6th of June your statement of the previous day in the House of Commons declaring neutrality in the dispute looked as though it might lead to a détente in our steadily worsening relations with Iraq, but this was short-lived.

/The Jordan

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The Jordan/United Arab Republic accusation that British and American planes were giving air-cover to the Israeli forces quickly gained widespread credence, because with effect from the previous day Baghdad radio had been constantly linked to Cairo radio and any pretence of an independent Iraqi stand on any question had in effect been abdicated by this one act. I immediately called on the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to assure him that these reports were untrue. Later the same day, when the official statement contained in your Guidance telegram No. 128 had been received, I made a similar démarche to the President and yet another to the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. In both cases my assurances were received in good part, especially by the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, who though puzzled by King Hussein's association with these allegations, was nevertheless clearly inclined to believe your and the Prime Minister's denials. The President was more non-committal. Be this as it may, it did not prevent the Iraq Cabinet, of which three of the more balanced members (Tahir Yahya, Abdul Ghani Rawi and Dr. Adnan al Pachachi) were absent, from deciding to sever diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government. I was called from sleep at 1.45 a.m. local time on the 7th of June to be given this information by the Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - the acting Minister having apparently been unwilling to do so. The formal communication stated quite clearly that the rupture had taken place because the United States and Great Britain had effectively

/co-operated

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co-operated in military air operations against the Arab states and supported the Israeli enemy by affording protective air cover over its territories by the use of American and British aircraft-carriers in the Mediterranean and also of bases in the vicinity of the battle fields. In handing me this communication, Mr. Nuri Jamil expressed the view that reasonable delay would be accorded to the British and American staffs to leave Iraq and that some administrative and consular personnel might be allowed to remain. He asked that we should establish contact with the Protocol Department the following day. This was done but it was clear that Protocol Department had no instructions and no views, and accordingly on the morning of the 8th the Head of Chancery called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose informally arrangements which would have necessitated the departure only of the Heads of Mission and Service Attachés of each party. This suggestion was taken in good part, but the decision clearly no longer rested with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was, we were told, to be considered by the Cabinet that evening.

8. In view of the rupture of relations the evacuation of the wives and families of British staff and members of the community was fixed for the night of the 8th. Since the airport was closed and the rail service suspended, the only way out was by road to Iran and a hundred and one men, women and children in two buses and nineteen cars left Baghdad at about 11.15 p.m. The departure of this convoy on a hot and stuffy night was a somewhat emotional affair. It involved the separation of between forty and fifty
/families

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families and, given the turbulent nature of the Iraqis a possible risk not only for the large number of women driving their own cars in the convoy but also for the men folk who remained behind. It was in fact nearly twenty-four hours of almost continuous wakefulness before many of these ladies reached Tehran, six hundred miles distant. The Iraq Petroleum Company organised their own evacuation of dependents to Abadan by road.

9. The separation of the Embassy families was however to be of short duration. For not long after the convoy had left I was again called from bed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handed a slip of paper in Arabic without heading, recording a "decision" that I myself, Her Majesty's Consul in Baghdad and Her Majesty's Consul-General in Basra should leave within forty-eight hours and the rest of the Embassy and Consulate staffs within a week and that the Embassy and the Consulate-General in Basra should be "closed and placed under guard" - presumably by the Iraqi authorities - within the seven days. The British Council and institutes were also to be closed. In short, we were treated as enemies and at war with Iraq. I informed the Head of Protocol that there were some items in this communication which Her Majesty's Government would not accept - notably concerning the closure and placing under guard of the Embassy. I also took this last opportunity to express my thanks to him for the co-operation which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in the past given and was still giving to Her Majesty's Embassy, and at the same time added a few somewhat terse views on

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the behaviour of the Iraq Government. In fact, I have not been able to decide to what extent the decision to make this drastic break was independently arrived at by the Iraq Government. By the time it was taken the Jordanian and United Arab Republic armies were already on their knees. Even the Iraqis had suffered losses in Jordan virtually without fighting. The "lie" of Anglo-American co-operation with Israel was already beginning to wear thin. I think that certainly the younger and more nationalist members of the Iraq Government were in a sufficiently emotional state to agree to almost any measures against British interests but, in view of the formal mention of British air-cover for Israel in the communication breaking relations, I suspect also that there was a feeling in the Iraq Government - probably strongly reinforced from Cairo - that an attempt must be made to make the "lie" "stick" by following it up with actions which flowed logically from its truth or at least showed that the Iraq Government believed it to be true. Accordingly, the Embassies of the United States and Great Britain were treated as though their two countries were at war with Iraq. Guards were posted on the gates and all comings and goings were checked. It was a somewhat sad and farfical game of make-believe which well illustrates the character of the Iraq Governments since the Revolution of 1958, and one which, as I have suggested in Tehran telegram No. 6 Daving of the 14th of June, may also conceal a long-standing resentment on the part of the Iraqi military régime at humiliations (real or imagined) at British hands since the ignominious failure of the

/Iraqi

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Iraqi revolt of 1941 under Rashid Ali al Gailani.

11. The fact that this decision was communicated on Thursday night and that the next day, the 9th of June, was a weekly holiday, did not help with preparations for our departure. Nor did the announcement of President Nasser's resignation on the same day. For a large part of the day crowds surged up and down the road to the Presidency, which is also the road one has to take from the Chancery to the Ambassador's Residence. During the evening the crowds became denser and there was a good deal of chanting of slogans. Although these manifestations were not highly organised and did not appear to be particularly antagonistic, it was clearly wiser not to tempt providence by venturing among them. Indeed, two members of the staff who, on the evening of the 9th, tried to approach the Chancery were given a somewhat unpleasant, though not violent, reception. The same was true the following morning when, to take leave of the staff, I was obliged to go to the Chancery by launch.

12. On that evening, the 10th of June, we left in convoy at 6 p.m. local time for the frontier. Of the Embassy staff there were my wife, myself and Her Majesty's Consul. There were forty-eight other members of the British community in their cars and in a bus. The Ambassadors of the Western European countries (with the significant exception of the Italian Ambassador) and of Iran kindly assembled to bid us farewell. Our convoy, escorted by armed police, reached the frontier about 10.30 p.m. It was a slow and hot journey enlivened by one trivial but, at first blush, alarming /incident.

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incident. At the frontier the convoy was greeted by Mr. St. John Armitage (First Secretary, Commercial), who on two occasions (on the 8th and 10th of June), despite a ban on members of the diplomatic corps leaving Baghdad, had travelled alone to the frontier and both established relations with the authorities there, which facilitated exit formalities, and set up a canteen with cold beer, hot coffee, sandwiches and biscuits for the evacuees. On both occasions (and also on the final evacuation of the Embassy staff on the 15th of June, when he preceded the main convoy) his presence and refreshments greatly relieved the discomforts of the journey and, what was more, markedly raised the morale of the evacuees. On the night of the 10th he was assisted by a representative of the United States Embassy, whom he in turn assisted later in the night, when the final evacuation of the staff of the United States Embassy took place.

13. At this point my personal experiences in Iraq cease. I can only record that from the time of my departure until that of the bulk of the Embassy staff the Iraq Government used their best endeavours to stimulate anti-British and anti-American feelings, though without very great success. There were various small, unpleasant but not very significant incidents involving both members of the staff and of the British community. During this period an enormous amount of hard work had to be got through very fast, both in the final liquidation of the political and confidential archives of the Embassy - the Registry staff looked like chimney-sweeps from the beginning of June until the day they left - and in order to make an orderly hand-over of Her Majesty's

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Government's properties and hirings to the representatives of the Swedish Embassy. Although we, in Baghdad, had kept our administrative affairs as rigourously up-to-date as was feasible, it is now clear to me that the dictum memento mori should be constantly in the minds of all Missions (as of all Heads of Missions!) in Arab countries.

14. On arrival in Iran we and the other evacuees were received by a member of the staff of the Tehran Embassy and when we reached Tehran itself, were greeted by the most effective reception arrangements, set on foot in the Embassy compound by H.M. Ambassador, his staff and more particularly the wives of his staff. By and large each one of us was taken in by his (or her) opposite number in the Tehran Embassy and cared for until despatched either by air or overland. I am sure I am speaking for the whole of the staff from Baghdad and, indeed, for many of the British community who came with us or who found their own way to Tehran, in thanking Sir Denis Wright and his staff in accepting us so warmly and coping so well with what must have been an onerous intrusion into their daily lives and the privacy of their homes. I should also mention the fact that the Iranian authorities within their terms of reference (and often, indeed, going beyond them) did their best to facilitate and expedite the influx of some hundreds of British subjects, both in the North and in the South, many of whom, to put it mildly, were ill-documented. For example, one member of the final convoy entered Iran without a travel document, having left Iraq under a blanket at the back of a car.

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15. I would like to end this already long despatch with a brief comment on the policy of the Iraq Government during this crisis. My first observation is that the interests of the people of Iraq as such - tired as they are of internal upheavals and deprived as they are by politics and incompetence from the economic and social progress to which they were entitled - played virtually no part in the Iraq Government's calculations or actions. As I have said, any possibility which still remained of presenting a specifically Iraqi view or a specifically Iraqi policy on the course of events was abdicated when the Baghdad broadcasting system was linked directly to Cairo mendacity and hysteria. Instead, a narrow, nationalistic pan-Arab policy was followed - and "followed" is the word, since the Iraqi leaders were clearly not in command of themselves or events - by the Government, the official media and the press. Disbelievers, such as General Fuad A., the Kurdish Vice-President, were swept along since they could not resist the tide. Any rational approach presented by the Americans and other Western Governments was qualified as pro-Israeli and characteristically described by a senior Iraqi official as "throwing us into the arms of Russia". The idea of an independent Arab policy to be worked out and patiently executed independently with Arab means, or the idea of attributing failures of policy to their own shortcomings - always difficult in the present psychotic state of the current Arab mentality - all this went completely by the board. Wishful thinking reigned. The Baghdad Times was still winning victories over Israel well after

/the United

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the United Arab Republic had ceased fighting. It is in short impossible to speak of an Iraqi policy beyond saying the Iraqi leaders, especially the junior ministers, probably believed quite seriously that they should and could meet and beat the Israelis in "the battle of destiny". Hence the importance of sending a token force to Egypt and the helter-skelter of getting some troops to Syria and Jordan where, arriving without their heavy armament, they could never have given a good account of themselves.

16. In respect of the rupture of relations between Iraq and Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government, the United Arab Republic's position again dominated that of the Iraq Government, the "lie" was probably believed and when belief was wearing thin was supported both from amour-propre and from the need for a scapegoat. The complete extent to which relations were broken - greater than in the case of either the United Arab Republic or Algeria - may represent a specifically Iraqi contribution. As I said in Tehran telegram No. 6 Saving of the 14th of June, the well-known extremism of the Iraqi character and the rancour of the Iraqi military against Britain in particular, probably played a leading part. The present Iraqi régime, which would like to be authoritarian, has found that its dependence on a largely Anglo-American oil company and on an Anglo-American oil market, has hindered its freedom of action. So has the fact that many of its civil servants and technicians were trained in the liberal and realistic systems of Britain and the United States. They were not willing tools of a Government run by O-level officers on a diet of slogans and ruling on the basis of wishful thinking and, where necessary, the pursuit of the lie rather than the truth.

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Their sincere advice was therefore considered an obstacle in the way of the "blessed" Iraqi revolution. Already there are indications that once again leading civil servants are being axed to obtain a more pliant if inferior (both in mental calibre and technical ability) administrative machine.

17. In Iraq, as in the other Arab countries, the present crisis has shown up the bankruptcy of military régimes. That a military régime should have made a mess of administration, diplomacy and politics is perhaps understandable, but one would have thought they might at least have made a better showing at soldiering!

18. Finally, I would like to place on record my thanks to the staff of H.M. Embassy who throughout the period, worked long hard hours in sweltering heat and preserved a high morale and sense of solidarity. They had already been a splendid team and we were - I venture to think - a "happy Embassy". It was thus a great wrench to leave and I can say sincerely that my relief on arriving safe and sound on Iranian soil was tempered by the thought of my staff sticking it out in Baghdad for another five days and my fears that they might be less lucky than we. Fortunately those fears were not realised. I should like also to thank you, Sir, for the unfailing support of the Department during my Mission and particularly in the last difficult days.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(R. A. Beaumont)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Jones,

MR. Newall (Acc. Dept TRA 7000 Ex 19)

Tells me that the damage caused to the
Consulate at Sana during the recent riots
amounted to £150. The Swedes are
having the damage repaired

above
29/9/67

10,000 = 998

30/10/67

I R A Q

Basra Consulate-General entered
and stoned by mob on 5 June 1967. Broken window.

British Council Centre of English
Studies, Baghdad, damaged by intruders on
6 June 1967. Contents wrecked and looted,
car damaged. ~~£ 1500~~

Total 12 692.540

approx £ 690

+ July 2

Form ME/67
Returned.

1

Furniture and personal effects
left behind in Baghdad, and loss of
lease of flat

£ 2,800

24/10

UNCLASSIFIED
(P1937/67)

~~EASTERN~~ DEPT.,
✓ F.O.

KL 6197/1/1.



Reg
D²/₈

With the compliments of
**HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY**

Spoke to Miss
Marchant (C.R.D.)
She will pass a
copy of all this
to the Brit Com.

**BRITISH EMBASSY
STOCKHOLM**

27. July. 1967.

PA. A. STA
519

RESTRICTED

Reference FLG 193 M/1

MR. MONTGOMERY
(EASTERN DEPARTMENT)

(6)

CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQ

We spoke.

2. I attach a summary of claims known to us which could be presented to the Iraqi Government at the appropriate time which is of course for you to decide.
3. The method of presentation is also a political decision but the various ways are as follows.
 - (a) Aide Memoire to M.F.A.
 - (b) Formal note to M.F.A. followed in each case by informal discussions for settlement or formal negotiations for an International Agreement.
4. As so little is involved I think that there would not be any idea of formal negotiations. It seems to me that the way to bring up the claims would be by an Aide Memoire given to M.F.A. either when the Ambassador first goes to M.F.A. after presenting his credentials or shortly thereafter.
5. The grounds for the claims would be as stated in your minute of 7 November, 1967.
6. If it is decided to present claims by Note or Aide Memoire, the document should either be drafted by Claims Department or cleared with us. In either case a Legal Advisor should also see and approve.

F.C.S. Bayliss

(F.C.S. Bayliss)
CLAIMS DEPARTMENT
30th April, 1968

*Thank you. H.M. Amb. (designate)
has been briefed accordingly. He
leaves for B'dad. on 27 May. We
await his advice on when to proceed
with the drafting of a Note to the
Iraqi M.F.A., submitting our claim*

RESTRICTED

Montgomery
See over *hms 24/5-5*

Mr Montgomery,

Please see your minute of 7, November 1967 and Mr Berman's minute of 15, November 1967. Can you obtain the required information the reports on the file do not give first hand evidence.

Mr. Hennessey
Claims Dept-²⁴/₅.

Miss Hennessey (Claims Department)

[flag A] In paragraphs 4 and 5 of Sir R. Beaumont's despatch of 31 July, 1967, we are told of the contribution to the build up of emotional feeling in Iraq made by the news media - which was (and still is) Government controlled. Expression was given to this emotion in an officially authorised public demonstration in Baghdad on 1 June. The demonstration was well organised e.g. transport was provided for inter alios government workers to attend.

2. In view of the history of anti British demonstrations and mob violence in Iraq over the past 10 years (not only in the context of the Arab/Israel saga) the Iraq Government must have known that any deterioration of the Arab/Israel situation as it was on 1 June, 1967, would at least seriously increase the likelihood of mob action against British institutions and those of other Western countries associated in Arab minds with Israel. It follows from this that with anti-British feeling already running high, actively encouraged by Baghdad Radio's emotional broadcasts condemning H.M.G.'s declaration about freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, they should have realised that the outbreak of an Arab/Israel war would inevitably result in some form of violent anti-British action. The war started in the early hours of 5 June.

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/3. In

-2-

3. In the case of the British Council property, I cannot agree that we do not have adequate information - or indeed evidence of Iraqi official negligence. It is clear from paragraph 5 of the report dated 6 June of Mr. Muir, who was British Council representative, and the account (which was based on eye witness reports) of the attack on the Council premises by Mr. Nash, that the Iraq authorities had given no thought to precautionary measures for British institutions. Mr. Muir draws attention to the inadequacy, and by extension the ease with which protection could have been provided if the Iraqis had been so inclined, of the police guard on British Council premises*. And this, despite the fact that there were two police stations and a security/post close by.

[flag C]

* even after the attack.

/police

4. The attack on the Council premises on 6 June, occurred after the wildly hysterical broadcasts over Baghdad and Cairo radio alleging British and United States intervention on the side of Israel. Whether or not it had occurred to the Iraq Government that the earlier emotional broadcasts by Baghdad Radio would lead to anti-British (or Western) action, it would surely be naive to take the view - given the precedents and their moral responsibility towards the foreign community in Iraq - that they could not have foreseen that the broadcasting of such highly inflammatory statements would precipitate mob action against British and American institutions in Iraq?

5. In the case of H.M. Consul-General at Basra, the attack occurred about Midday on 5 June i.e. before the allegations of British intervention on the side of the Israelis. Normally, there were two policemen on duty at the Consulate-General. When H.M. Consul-General saw the mob forming up on 5 June, he telephoned the Mutasarrif (Governor) and requested immediate reinforcements. The authorities were therefore fully aware of the danger. Two police officers and 6 men arrived at the Consulate-General in response to H.M.C.G.'s appeal but they can hardly be described as adequate reinforcements to restrain a screaming mob of several hundred. It may not be relevant here, but I think it is worth mentioning that it was only the thickness of the walls and the stoutness of the door of the Consulate-General in Basra which averted serious injury to the staff - and possibly even tragedy.

[MR Avery, Cons. Dept. who was H.M. Consul at Basra, lived through this attack]

6. H.M. Ambassador in Baghdad was briefed about the question for our claim for compensation. Unfortunately, in talking a few days after his arrival to the Iraqi Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (there is no Foreign Minister) he suggested to the Minister that the early settlement of H.M.G.'s claim for compensation which "had been submitted" would have a good effect. The Ambassador reported (Baghdad telegram No. 23 of 3 June) that the Minister was "receptive". The Ambassador's slip (to which his attention has been drawn) has provided a fortuitously welcome indication that the Iraq Government does not, in principle, dispute the validity of our claim. If there had been any doubt about this in their minds, I feel sure that the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs would have reacted differently.

/7. I

RESTRICTED

-3-

7. I suggest that we should get on quickly with the preparation of our claim.

D. Montgomery

(D. Montgomery)

12 June, 1968

RESTRICTED

IRAQ

Damage and losses resulting from the Middle East hostilities of June 1967.

Baghdad Official Property

The Centre of English Studies was attacked on June 6, the building, equipment and car were damaged. The police assumed responsibility for the protection of the building and equipment from that day onwards. On June 18 the disappearance of certain equipment was reported by the man in charge of the Centre.

The total amount involved is I.D.892.540.

Basra Official Property

Her Majesty's Government's Consulate General in Basra was stoned by a mob and entered on June 5. The flag was burnt and windows broken. The Protecting Power (Swedes) arranged for the damage to be repaired at a cost of £150.

Individuals

We have no record of Embassy staff, British Council staff or private individuals suffering losses or damage as a result of the June riots but the following have reported property left behind which has since been

recovered and some items have been reported missing,
but it is unlikely that the Iraqi Govt could be held responsible,
 Mr. and Mrs. Tong

Miss Roberts

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Carnan

Mr. Muir

Mr. Hartley

~~Mr. Thomas~~

Two notes were sent by the Swedes reserving our

/rights

rights for payment of compensation. The first was sent on July 7 and was followed by the other on July 19 setting out in detail the losses, damages and amounts. The total is approximately £1040.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 23 3 June, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
- 7 JUN 1968
KLG
193111

Mr. H. H. 12/6/68
Mr. Bonfanti
Miss Hanning
(7)
(8)

I had my first business meeting with Acting M.F.A. on 1 June and raised the following, leaving appropriate bouts de papier :-

- (a) Discrimination against British trade. I requested that appropriate measures be taken by Iraqi Government as soon as possible to remove restrictions. He said that this would be done (some intending importers of British goods are already getting the necessary permits);
- (b) Measures against the British clubs in Baghdad and Basra. I requested that measures be rescinded. He agreed that this was reasonable and undertook to take the matter up with Minister of Interior;
- (c) He similarly agreed regarding measures taken against British church (Baghdad chaplaincy);
- (d) British Council. He also agreed that measures affecting British Council should be rescinded and suggested that you consider taking up question of re-opening with Minister of Education;
- (e) Claims for damage to British property. (British Council premises in Baghdad and Her Majesty's Consulate General in Basra). I reminded him that claims for compensation had been submitted and suggested that early settlement would have a good effect. He was receptive.

2. I took the opportunity to refer to Press reports that there would be a demonstration in Baghdad on 5 June, the anniversary of Israel attack. M.F.A. said that the demonstration was not directed against us and when I suggested that there was always some danger of such things getting out of hand and that precautionary measures might be indicated, said that of course Iraqi Government were responsible for law and order.

3. Mr. Khaira[gp undec]h's attitude throughout was as friendly as it was when I paid my formal call on him on arrival and when I presented my letters to the President.

4. I was also received on 1 June by the Prime Minister who assured me of his Government's desire to see Anglo-Iraqi relations established on a sound basis and to assist me in every way in the accomplishment of my mission. Senior officials at M.F.A. on whom I also called, showed marked friendliness.

Mr. Evans.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. Eastern Dept. Defence Dept. C.O. S.A.D.
N.E.A.D. E.R.D. Mediterranean Dept.
Arabian Dept. C.R.D. DIS MOD
Claims Dept.

88888

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

Eastern

Mr. R. [unclear]
Miss Kennedy
Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s) *(8)*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Emergency~~
~~Immediate~~
~~Priority~~
Routine

(Date) *7/6/62*

Despatched *11:04 AM*

~~En Clair~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

Restricted

[Codeword—if any]

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. *44*

(Date) *6/6*

And to:—

Addressed to

[Baghdad]

telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

LAB	<i>(7)</i>
REF	
HEAT	
REL	

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Files
Eastern
Claims

Copies to:—

*Your Telno. 23. Paragraph 1(e).
detailed
A claim for compensation has
not yet been submitted to Iraq
Govt. Swedes ^{merely} submitted official
Note to M.F.A. in July 1967
formally reserving H.M.G.'s
rights.*

*2. Guidance is contained in
briefing notes which follow by
bag.*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

17076/62

6/6

~~10 June 1968.~~IRAQ.

Official Property destroyed and damaged
during civil disturbances after 4 June 1967.

H.M.Consulate-General, Basra.

The building was stoned by a mob and entered on June 5. The flag was burnt and window panes broken. The Protecting Power (Swedes) arranged for the damage to be repaired at a cost of £ 150

Centre of English Studies, Baghdad.

The building was attacked on June 6. The building, equipment and car were damaged. On June 18 the disappearance of certain equipment was reported by the man in charge of the Centre.

The total amount involved is
 Iraqi Dinars 892.540 - approx - £ 892

Total £ 1042

=====

Private Property left behind in Baghdad

in June 1967. (see attached list of 9 names)

10 June 1968.IRAQ.Private Property left behind in Baghdad in June 1967.Summary of individual files.

KLG 193/1/2

CARNAN, Mr. A.C. M.Inst.M.S.M.
(Coseley Buildings Ltd. Wolverhampton)

Personal possessions left at
127/1 Kurd AL Pasha, Karada El Sharkiya,
Baghdad, in June 1967.

On 18/3/68 Mr. Carnan stated that
from information received he understood
that his possessions in Iraq were as he
left them. He had been unable to make
any arrangements for their removal due
to the present situation.

KLG 193/1/11

TONG, Mr. and Mrs. R.L.S. (British Council)

Personal and household effects
left in Baghdad in June 1967.

On 30/3/68 Mr. Tong stated that
the property had been recovered with the
exception of:

Missing items	£ 88.10.0.
Household items broken	47.11.6.

Mr. Tong also wishes to claim
a refund of expenditure on
servants' wages etc.

90. 0.0. 226.1.6.

KLG 193/1/9

ROBERTS, Miss G.T. (British Council)

One trunk containing personal effects left in the care of an Iraqi employee of the British Council. *Left in flat - Employer has key - to take trunk to place of safety.*

On 18/3/68 Miss Roberts stated
to the best of her knowledge the
property is irrecoverable as neither
the trunk nor the Iraqi employee can
be traced.

*Employee has since been traced, 100.0.0.
but the trunk is still missing.*

KLG 193/1/7

MUIR, Mr. J.G.G. (British Council)

Personal and household effects
left in Br. Council rented house in
Baghdad.

On 1/4/68 Mr. Muir stated that
his property (with the exception of
some items he hoped to sell) arrived
in this country but are still stored
and he cannot say how much or how
little of his property has safely
been recovered.

KLG 193/1/10

THOMAS, Mr. D.R. (British Council)

Glasses and minor items of
clothing left behind in Basrah.

On 19/3/68 Mr. Thomas stated
that the articles are packed and
ready for despatch.

*Effects have now arrived in Istanbul
but are not yet unpacked.*

- 2 -

IRAQPrivate Property.

KLG 193/1/12

WILSON, Mr. P.J. (ex Baghdad)

Mr. Wilson was on U.K. leave a few days before the June outbreak in the M.E. His effects were in Baghdad. They were packed and despatched to Teheran and then to Stockholm.

Articles valued £ 170 were missing from the lift-van when it reached Stockholm.

£ 170.0.0.

The following British Council Staff have recovered their property intact:

KLG 193/1/4

COX, Mr. P.H.

KLG 193/1/6

HARTLEY, Mr. C.J.

KLG 193/1/8

PATERSON, Mrs. L.

KLG 193/1/3

PIEROTTI, Mr. D.W.H. formerly of the British Embassy, Baghdad.)- Possible loss in value of his car due to delay in shipping it to Stockholm where Mr. Pierotti was transferred.

~~MR BAYLISS~~
~~Mr Bayliss~~

Reference.....

(10)

Mr Bayliss ✓

IRAQ

Damage and losses resulting from the Middle East
hostilities of June 1967.

A summary of the claims is at Flag E

FLAG D

The Legal Adviser minuted in November 1967 to the effect that we had more in the way of opinions about the theoretical basis of our potential claims than we had in the way of evidence. Mr. Montgomery has now answered that minute and if it is acceptable, and, if Mr. Berman would give his opinion on the attached claims we are ready to approach the Iraqi authorities.

Flag D

In the case of the individuals there does not appear to be a prima facie case against the Iraqi authorities.

The Ambassador's report of the events is at Flag A and the British Council representative's report is at Flag B & C

FLAG F

When presenting his credentials on the resumption of diplomatic relations, the Ambassador reminded the Iraqis that a claim for compensation had already been submitted, this was of course not so, the Swedes

FLAG G

had reserved our rights.

A. M. Hennessy
(A.M. Hennessy) (Miss)

18 June 1968

Mr Berman *M. J. D. M.*
14 VIII

I think we can put in
the "official claim", but on the facts
we cannot hold the Iraqi govt responsible

the individual "losses" - Do you
agree that we should write & tell
him so?

F. C. S. Bayly
18/6

Mr Bayly,

Draft letter & Note for
Baghdad attached.

I will draft letters to
individuals after despatch
of letter.

not ^{23/8}

Mr Derman

Any comments?

F. C. S. Bayly
23/8

The Note should undoubtedly follow
the recent grant for other war
Eastern countries, of which I do not
have copies. You need not bother

me 27/8

To be submitted

The Note follows that of the 26. viii 68

J. G. M.

Mr - Bayliss, (11)

Mr Carnan (file ^{KLG 193/1/2} attached)
 may eventually have a
 claim against the Iraqi
 Govt. I have, therefore,
 added a paragraph to
 the draft to Baghdad
 asking whether there are
 municipal remedies for private
 claimants.

Resubmitted
 28/8/67.

TO ISSUED

7/22/8

Mr Hennessey 27/8

RESTRICTED

FOREIGN OFFICE. S.W.1.

28 August, 1968.

(KLG 193/1/1)

12

LART	
REF.	
NCAT	16
REF.	

Riot damage June 1967

We now have all the necessary details available of loss and damage to official property in Iraq.

2. We must, however, leave it to you to insert the final figure, since that provided by the Swedish Embassy does not take account of the repairs to the official car, piano and film projector. A copy of the list provided by the Swedes in July 1967 is enclosed. You are no doubt aware that the rate of exchange should be that prevailing at the time of the loss and damage.

3. We should be glad, therefore, if, provided you have no objections, you would now present these claims to the Iraqi Government.

4. Your Note should make it clear that the Note is without prejudice to other claims which might arise from the same circumstances. (A draft Note is enclosed)

5. We would like to have a copy of the Note which you deliver to the Iraqis.

6. There may be a private claim against the Iraqi Government, and in this connexion we need to know whether there are any municipal remedies available under which the claimant can pursue a claim against the Iraqi Government. We should be grateful if you would look into this for us.

(F.C.S. Bayliss)
CLAIMS DEPARTMENT.

P. McKearney, Esq.,
Baghdad.

RESTRICTED

LAG.

Mr Bayliss,

With reference to your minute of 18 June, I am attaching draft letters to individuals whose losses do not appear to ^{be} the responsibility of the Iraqi Government.

Miss Roberts- a trunk of personal effects and key to British Council. her flat were left in the care of an Iraqi employee. The ~~flat~~ was apparently broken in to and the trunk stolen.

Mr Tong - Left Baghdad on 8 May on leave. House British Council was left in care of two caretakers. Mr Tong did not return to Baghdad. after the events of June 1967, but was posted to New Delhi. Some items were found to be missing when effects arrived at post.

Mr Wilson - Left Baghdad on leave on 17 May. F.O. He did not return to Baghdad. Some items were found to be missing when his effects arrived in Stockholm.

Chr. Hennessy 4/9.

Registry
No. KLG 193/1/

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

RESTRICTED

DRAFT

Type 1 + 4

12

From
F. C. S. Bayliss

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department
Claims

To:—

P. McKearney,
Baghdad

Riot damage June 1967

We now have all the necessary details available of loss and damage to official property in Iraq.

2. We must, however, leave it to you to insert the final figure, since, that, provided by the Swedish Embassy does not take account of the repairs to the official car, piano and Film Projector. A copy of the list provided by the Swedes in July 1967 is enclosed. You are no doubt aware that the rate of exchange should be that prevailing at the time of the loss and damage.

3. We should be glad, therefore, if, provided you have no objections, you would now present these claims to the Iraqi Government.

4. Your Note should make it clear that the Note is without prejudice to other claims which might arise from the same circumstances. (A draft Note is enclosed)

5. We would like to have a copy of the Note which you deliver to the Iraqis.

RESTRICTED

6. ~~There~~ may ~~be~~ a private claim against the Iraqi Government, and in this connexion we need to know

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

MR BERMAN
LEGAL
ADVISER.

LARGE
ENVELOPE
PLEASE

whether there are ~~xxx~~ any municipal remedies
available under which the claimant can
pursue a claim against the ^{IRAQI} Government.

We should be grateful if you would look into
this for us.

Not 20/8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

E12

DRAFT NOTE VERBALE

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy present
their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and with reference to the Swedish Embassy's Note
No. 13 of the 8th of July 1967 have the honour to
- - - forward herewith a schedule giving details of
losses and damage sustained in the disturbances of
June 1967 by the British Consulate-General in Basra
and the Centre of English Studies and British
Council in Baghdad.

On instruction from Her Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the
Embassy accordingly requests payment of compensation
amounting to (to be inserted by post) in respect
thereof.

This Note is without prejudice to other
claims which, arising from the loss of or
damage to the private property of United Kingdom
nationals in June 1967, Her Majesty's Government
reserve the right to present later.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avail etc.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Ed. (3746)

Registry No.	NOTE VERBALE.	Type 1 + E12
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:—	From
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.		Telephone No. & Ext.
PRIVACY MARKING		Department
..... In Confidence		
	<p>Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents her compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Swedish Embassy's Note No. 13 of 8 July 1967 has the honour to forward herewith a schedule giving details of losses and damage sustained in the disturbances of June 1967 by the British Consulate-General in Basra and the Centre of English Studies and British Council in Baghdad.</p> <p>Her Majesty's Government hold the Government of Iraq responsible for these losses and damage.</p> <p>On instruction from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the Embassy accordingly requests payment of compensation amounting to (.to be inserted by post).. in respect thereof.</p> <p>This Note is without prejudice to other claims which, arising from the loss of or damage to the private property of United Kingdom nationals in June 1967, Her Majesty's Government reserve the right to present later.</p> <p>Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy avails etc,</p>	

AMH 28/8

Mr. BermanMr. Montgomery(Eastern Dept.) *minute.*

Having read these papers and papers entered Claims Dept., I am a little disturbed at the course the various problems have taken.

2. The various "Claims" fall under a number of heads:-

By Iraq

- a) Contractual debts said to have been incurred by Her Majesty's Forces many years ago.
- b) Collision between Her Majesty's ship and Iraqi ship.

By Her Majesty's Government

- a) For services of R.N. personnel in 1958.
- b) Tuition and Maintenance charges for Iraqi Military Students.
- c) Damage, loss, etc. to official and private property arising out of the Arab-Israel War, 1967.

By individuals

- a) Breach of Contract 1967.
- b) Losses arising out of Arab-Israel War, 1967.

3. Although the minuting in KLG 193/1/1 shows that Claims Dept. was vetting claims arising out of the war and processing them for presentation, unbeknown to us Eastern Dept., Stockholm and Baghdad have been going it alone in the cases of Messrs. Digby and Humbley, Owens and Mackinnon without consulting us or a legal Adviser and on 28 August (KLG 193/1/1) we told Baghdad to present the official Arab war claim and reserve rights for private claims.

4. In the end a "Package Deal" may well be the right solution but at this stage I do not think that contractual liabilities between the two Governments, similar liabilities between the Iraq Government and U.K. nationals, and the liability in tort of Her Majesty's Government (the ships) should be mixed up with claims by Her Majesty's Government and individuals arising out of breaches of International Law (June, 1967) as each category falls to be dealt with differently.

5. All but the last category are not "claims" in International Law for which compensation can be claimed.

In my opinion the Intergovernment contractual "Claims and Counter claims" and the tort claim should be kept separate and a settlement sought by set off.

The 1967 war losses should be taken up by Her Majesty's Government only where we and our legal Adviser are satisfied that (a) there are no municipal remedies (b) there is prima facie evidence that the Iraqi Government can be held liable in International Law.

6. One of my objections to a full "Package Deal" is that if as a result of crediting the Iraqis with certain sums, either Her Majesty's Government would have to pay them or the amount received by Her Majesty's Government would be less than the total of our "International" claims so that the money would have to be found on the F.O. vote to pay private individuals for their losses.

7. So far as the "Claims" for losses by individuals, arising out of the 1967 war are concerned I have the following comments:-

a) Messrs. Hundley and Digby

1) Digby

As will be seen from his letter of 8 September, 1967 (No.17 EQ 18/6) he was requesting an interpretation of his Contract at (16) but his application was rejected on the grounds that his Contract had been fulfilled & his request was out of time. While it might be arguable that he did not have time to appeal in accordance with Art. 17 of his Contract, unless it can be proved that the Committee were not consulted I do not see how any international claim would lie, as the Committee's decision is final, unless we could prove a denial of justice.

2) Mr. Hundley

His claim is at (9) in EQ 6/8 and specimen Contract at (16), but I can find no trace of it having been rejected.

It will be noted that it is dated "London 22 August, 1967" and that he states his Contract was terminated on 31 July, 1967. He was therefore out of time in accordance with Clause 17 of the Contract -

Though it is for the Iraqis to interpret the Contract. I think he had a good claim under A and D, but I doubt whether B and C are covered by the Contract and equally are too remote to engage the responsibility of the Iraqis under International Law.

If the Iraqis reject his claims under A and D, I doubt whether an international claim on the grounds of a denial of justice (Ch. 9 Foreign Service Instructions) would lie.

b) Mr. C.L. Owens (EQ 6/8 at (42))

1) Personal effects - Annexes A & B.

There is absolutely no evidence of looting or damage during civil disturbances which might engage the responsibility of the Iraqi Government and Claims Dept. would not be prepared to pass this claim as suitable for presentation as a claim for breach of International Law.

2) Travel expenses in the U.K.!

I have seen some amazing claims put forward during my 8 years in Claims Dept. but Annex C beats the lot! He left voluntarily. -

How can the international responsibility of the Iraqi Government be invoked to pay for junketing around in hired cars and vans in the U.K.?

If I had seen this letter from Mr. Hyde I could not have concurred in Mr. Makinson's letter of 29 July (44).

c) Mr. Mackinnon

My comments on Mr. Owens case apply.

d) Miss Roberts, Mr. Tong (British Council) and Mr. Wilson (F.O.).

Their "claims" are very similar to those of Messrs. Owens and Mackinnon and we had already decided that they could not be presented.

If we are overruled and the Owens, Mackinnon Claims are taken up then we would be forced to put these three up as well.

8. I apologize for the length and tone of this minute but Claims work is highly technical and Her Majesty's Government can be made to look very foolish and the prospects of settlement of good claims can be seriously prejudiced if posts abroad are instructed to present formal Governmental claims in respect of matters which by no stretch of the imagination can be held to be breaches of International Law.

May I respectfully draw Eastern Dept.'s attention to Ch. II page 3 para. 12 and page 4 para. 16 of the F.O. Order Book (which so far as I am aware has not been repealed) and express the hope that all further correspondence on these Iraqi "Claims" be cleared in the Claims Dept.

9. Subject to the views of Mr. Berman, I suggest that Baghdad be instructed:-

- 1) To present the official claim as proposed in my letter of 28 August (KLG 193/1/1 at (12)).
- 2) Defer any further action on all the other claims and counter claims pending further instructions.

F.C.S. Bayliss

(F.C.S. Bayliss) CLAIMS DEPT.
9 September, 1968.

The essential thing seems to me to be to have separate the claims under international law for the rest of last June as the reg. by of speculative as non-international items. Subject to that, I see no reason why some way could not be found to have a channel of

communication between the British and
affected & the British employee,
the Iraqi Government.

J. J. M.

10 iv 68
Reference: EQ LO/6

Mr. Bayliss (Claims Dept.)

Anglo/Iraq International Claims and other claims by
private individuals

We spoke, and have, I think, resolved our difficulties on the lines of Mr. Berman's helpful minute.

2. I agree that we should always pass on formal International Claims to be dealt with by Claims Dept., and that to include other unconvincing or unjustified private claims in a package deal could make matters worse.

3. Conversely, if private individuals, such as O.D.M. experts or British Council Teachers lose their goods as a secondary effect of the Iraqi government's fault (by the latter making it difficult for the owner to remain to protect them), especially if (see lines 4 - 8 of para. 2 of M.O.D. letter SA 383/415/02 of 24 July at F.42 in EQ 6/8) "the Treasury advised that an approach should first be made to the government of Iraq", it would be difficult for an Embassy not to interest themselves on behalf of the claimants, even though their claims were not properly the subject of an International Claim, as long as the Embassy make it clear that they are not presenting a formal note. I hope that the phrase in my letter "take up with the Iraqis" would guard against that interpretation.

4. I attach a draft letter to Mr. McKearney answering his query (the letter I first marked to you), and explaining the distinctions you draw. I should be glad to have any amendments.

D. J. Makinson

(D. J. Makinson)
Eastern Department, F.O.
Tel: 737
17 September, 1968.

Copies to:
EQ 6/8 KLG 193/1/1
C.R.D.

W(14)

Mr Watts Rose

EQ 6/8

Mr. Berman
Mr. Montgomery
 (Eastern Dept.)

Mr. Jones to see
 (re the 67 War claims)
 12/27/2

Having read these papers and papers entered Claims Dept., I am a little disturbed at the course the various problems have taken.

2. The various "Claims" fall under a number of heads:-

By Iraq

- a) Contractual debts said to have been incurred by Her Majesty's Forces many years ago.
- b) Collision between Her Majesty's ship and Iraqi ship.

By Her Majesty's Government

- a) For services of R.N. personnel in 1958.
- b) Tuition and Maintenance charges for Iraqi Military Students.
- c) Damage, loss, etc. to official and private property arising out of the Arab-Israel War, 1967.

By individuals

- a) Breach of Contract 1967.
- b) Losses arising out of Arab Israel War, 1967.

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4. In the end a "Package Deal" may well be the right solution but at this stage I do not think that contractual liabilities between the two Governments, similar liabilities between the Iraq Government and U.K. nationals, and the liability in tort of Her Majesty's Government (the ships) should be mixed up with claims by Her Majesty's Government and individuals arising out of breaches of International Law (June, 1967) as each category falls to be dealt with differently.

Mr. Berman
 I think you were dealing with these questions. Does it mean the way of the civil disturbances for which we have put in claims? (12/27/2)

Mr. Jones.
 Civil disturbances arising out of the war.

12/27/2

2 copies of this minute which is in our file is attached - with H/A's comments 12/27/2.

5. All but the last category are not "claims" in International Law for which compensation can be claimed.

In my opinion the Intergovernment contractual "Claims and Counterclaims" and the tort claim should be kept separate and a settlement sought by set off.

The 1967 war losses should be taken up by Her Majesty's Government only where we and our legal Adviser are satisfied that (a) there are no municipal remedies (b) there is prima facie evidence that the Iraqi Government can be held liable in International Law.

6. One of my objections to a full "Package Deal" is that if as a result of crediting the Iraqis with certain sums, either Her Majesty's Government would have to pay them or the amount received by Her Majesty's Government would be less than the total of our "International" claims so that the money would have to be found on the P.O. vote to pay private individuals for their losses.

7. So far as the "Claims" for losses by individuals arising out of the 1967 war are concerned I have the following comments:-

a) Messrs. Hurdley and Digby

1) Digby

As will be seen from his letter of 8 September, 1967 (No.17 EQ 18/6) he was requesting an interpretation of his Contract at (16) but his application was rejected on the grounds that his Contract had been fulfilled; his request was out of time. While it might be arguable that he did not have time to appeal in accordance with Art. 17 of his Contract, unless it can be proved that the Committee were not consulted I do not see how any international claim would lie, as the Committee's decision is final unless we could prove a denial of justice.

2) Mr. Hurdley

His claim is at (9) in EQ 6/8 and specimen Contract at (16), but I can find no trace of it having been rejected.

It will be noted that it is dated "London 22 August, 1967" and that he states his Contract was terminated on 31 July, 1967. He was therefore out of time in accordance with Clause 17 of the Contract -

Though it is for the Iraqis to interpret the Contract. I think he had a good claim under A and D, but I doubt whether B and C are covered by the Contract and equally are too remote to engage the responsibility of the Iraqis under International Law.

If the Iraqis reject his claims under A and D, I doubt whether an international claim on the grounds of a denial of justice (Ch. 9 Foreign Service Instructions) would lie.

b) Mr. G.L. Owens (BQ 6/8 at (42))

1) Personal effects - Annexes A & B.

There is absolutely no evidence of looting or damage during civil disturbances which might engage the responsibility of the Iraqi Government and Claims Dept. would not be prepared to pass this claim as suitable for presentation as claim for breach of International Law.^a

2) Travel expenses in the U.K.ⁱ

I have seen some amazing claims put forward during my 8 years in Claims Dept. but Annex C beats the lot! He left voluntarily. -

How can the international responsibility of the Iraqi Government be involved to pay for junketing around in hired cars and vans in the U.K.?

If I had seen this letter from Mr. Hyde I could not have concurred in Mr. Harkinson's letter of 29 July (44).

c) Mr. Harkinson

My comments on Mr. Owens case apply.

d) Mrs Roberts, Mr. Tong (British Council) and Mr. Wilson (P.O.).

Their "claims" are very similar to those of Messrs. Owens and Harkinson and we had already decided that they could not be presented.

**If we are overruled and the Owens,
Mackinnon Claims are taken up then we would
be forced to put these three up as well.**

**8. I apologize for the length and tone of this
minute but Claims work is highly technical and Her
Majesty's Government can be made to look very foolish
and the prospects of settlement of good claims can
be seriously prejudiced if posts abroad are instructed
to present formal Governmental claims in respect of
matters which by no stretch of the imagination can be
held to be breaches of International Law.**

**May I respectfully draw Eastern Dept.'s
attention to Ch. II page 3 para. 12 and page 4
para. 16 of the F.O. Order Book (which so far as I am
aware has not been repealed) and express the hope
that all further correspondence on these Iraqi "Claims"
be cleared in the Claims Dept.**

**9. Subject to the views of Mr. Berman, I suggest
that Baghdad be instructed:-**

- 1) To present the official claim as proposed in
my letter of 28 August (KLG 193/1/1 at (12)).**
- 2) Defer any further action on all the other
claims and counter claims pending further
instructions.**

**(F.C.S. Bayliss) CLAIMS DEPT..
9 September, 1968.**

15

Reference: EQ 10/6

Mr. Bayless (Claims Dept.)

Anglo/Iraq International Claims and other claims by
private individuals

We spoke, and have, I think, resolved our difficulties on the lines of Mr. Berman's helpful minute.

2. I agree that we should always pass on formal International Claims to be dealt with by Claims Dept., and that to include other unconvincing or unjustified private claims in a package deal could make matters worse.
3. Conversely, if private individuals, such as O.D.M. experts or British Council Teachers lose their goods as a secondary effect of the Iraqi government's fault (by the latter making it difficult for the owner to remain to protect them), especially if (see lines 4 - 8 of para. 2 of M.O.D. letter SA 353/415/02 of 24 July at P.42 in EQ 6/8) "the Treasury advised that an approach should first be made to the government of Iraq", it would be difficult for an Embassy not to interest themselves on behalf of the claimants, even though their claims were not properly the subject of an International Claim, as long as the Embassy makes it clear that they are not presenting a formal note. I hope that the phrase in my letter "take up with the Iraqis" would guard against that interpretation.
4. I attach a draft letter to Mr. McKearney answering his query (the letter I first marked to you), and explaining the distinctions you draw. I should be glad to have any amendments.

(D. J. Makinson)
Eastern Department, F.O.
Tel: 737
17 September 1968.

Copies to:
EQ 6/8
C.P.D.

KLG 193/1/1 ✓

BE
11/11/68
MH

letter

EQ 10/6

D. J. Makinson

P. McKearney, Esq.,
Baghdad.

Anglo/Iraqi International Claims, and other
claims by private individuals

Thank you for your letter 10/11 of
24 August, which has crossed Claims Dept.'s
letter KLG 193/1/1 of 28 August.

2. There are of course often ^{good} reasons
for lumping together several Claims and
Counter Claims, with the object of achieving
a quicker settlement, and this has largely
been done by Claims Department in their letter
under reference. The difficulty is that
in addition to International Claims arising
out of actions by Governments in breach of
International Law, there are also "claims"
(i.e. demands) which are not claims in the
technical sense, and which cannot be argued
on the same grounds - indeed their inclusions
might weaken a good International case.

3. Such claims include those of the four
O.D.M. experts, and the British Council staff
who cannot prove that their property was

stolen as a direct result of the events
of 5/6 June 1967, though they were no
doubt caused by it at one remove. The most
we can do for them is to ask you to act as
a post office for private citizen's grievance,
and hope that the Iraqis may perhaps
relent in the hope of a quid pro quo in,
for example, the aid / ^{or} training fields.

4. We hop^e/that our list of International
Claims is complete. As for the others,
we must just rely on you to do the best you
can, if only to have it on record that the
Iraqi government declines to accept
responsibility.

Enter 1/p.a.



BRITISH EMBASSY, 16

BAGHDAD.

UNCLASSIFIED

(6/33)

24 September, 1968.

LAST REF.	12.
NEXT REF.	

Dear Bayliss,

British and Iraqi Claims

36 EQ 10/6

Your letter KLG 193/1 of 28 August crossed my letter 10/11 of 24 August to Evans in Eastern Department suggesting that it might be worthwhile devising a comprehensive settlement to include all claims. I do not therefore propose to take action on your letter until I hear further.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter to Evans.

Yours ever,

P. McKearney
(P. McKearney)

F. C. S. Bayliss, Esq.,
Claims Department,
High Holborn.

c.c.

R. M. Evans, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.





With the compliments of
FOREIGN OFFICE

Eastern Department

LONDON, S.W.1.

17 September 1968

Mr Makinson,
Eastern Department.

(16)

Do you know whether
Baghdad have yet
presented our claims for
damage arising out of the
June 1967 events to the
Iraqi Government.

FRAG A
ATTACHED.

405/4471

X 733

The last letter on our file
indicates that they were
awaiting a letter from Eastern
Department.

My Heressey 1/11 I have
claims Dept.

Claims Dept

I have sent a reminder

The
6/11/68.

17

~~SECRET~~

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT,

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE, S.W.1.

NEA 10/5

7 November, 1968.

REF	
RE	
RE	
RE	0623/359/1

British and Iraqi Claims

Claims Department in their letter KIG 193/1/1 of 28 August asked you to deliver a note on the subject to the Iraqis.

2. In your letter 6/33 of 24 September you said you were holding action pending a reply to an earlier letter about compounding International Claims and private demands. The reply you sought did in fact cross your letter (our EQ 10/6 of 23 September).

3. We hope an opportunity to present the note has arisen. Can you let us know the state of play?

(D. J. Makinson)

P. McKearney, Esq.,
Baghdad.

BU 7^{inter}
12
68

LAST PAPER

Selection Of Claims For Compensation Against Iraq For Damage Occurring During Arab-Israeli War Of 1967. Claims Against Iraq During The Middle East Events In June 1967. 5 June 1967. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 64/98. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107455563/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=4b0d54a3&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.